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Abstract 
The resource water crosses national and regional borders, making coordination among 
different stakeholders and jurisdictions a relevant condition for successful trans-boundary water 
quality management. While cooperation is a well-studied issue in political science when it comes 
to conflict resolution or the management of so-called common pool resources, less attention is 
given to the actual causes of cooperation – and even less so to the influence borders might have 
on cooperation. We address this issue by combining insights from policy and border studies and 
by asking a) how actors involved in trans-boundary water quality management perceive the 
impact of borders on cross-border cooperation; and b) whether border perceptions have an 
impact on cooperation between such actors. Drawing on data from a survey in the cross-border 
region of Basel in the international catchment area of the river Rhine, we analyze border 
perceptions of and cooperation patterns among actors who are involved in water quality 
management of surface water of the river Rhine. Through a descriptive analysis we reveal actors’ 
perception pattern of border effects; via an inferential network analysis applying a statistical 
model of the family of exponential random graph models (ERGM) we test the influence these 
border perceptions have on cooperation among our set of actors. Our findings show that the 
perception of borders does have an impact on the emergence of cooperation, thereby enhancing 
common theories of cooperation. 
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Introduction 
When different actors jointly share or use natural resources, coordination of their actions and the 
exchange of information about the resources’ condition are essential. In the special case of the 
resource surface water, actions undertaken by up-stream actors can affect the condition of down-
stream actors. This brings a unidirectional externality into play that we do not observe with other 
natural resources. Also, water crosses regional or national borders, making resource use settings 
trans-boundary. In trans-boundary surface water settings the resource is used and managed by 
stakeholders from different regions or states, whose actions are based on different jurisdictions. 
To assure a harmonized and considerate management of the resource water, these actors need to 
discuss their needs regarding the resource and its services and coordinate their actions. In short, 
they need to work together, that is cooperate. Such multi-level, cross-sectoral and cross-border 
coordination is said to enhance effective and efficient policymaking and to guarantee the coherent 
management of the natural resource at stake (Lubell and Edelenbos 2013; Nesheim et al. 2010). 
If we claim that cooperation across borders is important in a trans-boundary surface water 
setting, we should think of what role such borders play when it comes to cooperation between 
these actors. Borders are not simply territorial dividing lines and political institutions. They are 
also social constructions (Paasi 1999). Their roles and signification cannot solely be derived by 
their forms or formal functions but emanate from the meanings actors attach to them through 
their practices and representations.  
In this paper we focus on the role the perceptions of national borders play in the context of trans-
boundary water quality management. We analyse how borders are perceived by actors engaged 
in trans-boundary water quality management and whether these perceptions have an effect on 
actors’ cooperation. We thus pose the following two research questions: How do actors engaged 
in trans-boundary water quality management perceive the impact of borders on cross-border 
cooperation? And to what extent do border perceptions impact cooperation among actors engaged 
in trans-boundary water quality management? 
To answer our research questions, we draw on data from the trans-boundary water quality 
management setting in the cross-border region of Basel, in the catchment area of the river Rhine. 
We collected data on collaborative interactions and border perceptions of actors engaged in water 
quality management in this region through a survey in spring 2016.  
Through a descriptive analysis of actors’ border perceptions we will answer our first research 
question. By applying inferential social network analysis running a statistical model of the family 
of exponential random graph models (ERGM) we test the influence border perceptions have on 
cooperation in a trans-boundary water quality management setting. 
The paper is structured as follows. The first section underlines the theoretical groundings of our 
study and develops the research hypotheses. The second section presents our research design and 
introduces the case selection, the method of data gathering, the operationalization of our 
dependent, independent and control variables and the statistical method applied. In the third 
section, we present our results. The last section sets out the wider conclusions of our findings. 
Theoretical background  
While cooperation is a well-studied issue in political science when it comes to conflict resolution 
or the management of so-called common pool resources, less attention is given to the actual causes 
of cooperation. Especially the influence of spatial dynamics on cooperation is not well examined. 
The study of the effects of political-administrative boundaries on policy ties remains a marginal 
topic of investigation in most social sciences that deal with such issues. We address this research 
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gap by combining insights from policy, common-pool resource (CPR), socio-ecological system and 
border studies, taking a more explorative approach when formulating our hypotheses. 
The definition of cooperation 
Cooperation is understood as a “working together” of two or more collective actors that aim at the 
same goal. The idea behind is that united actors achieve more benefits than on their own. If mutual 
working is not intentional it is considered “interaction”. The duration of cooperation can vary 
depending on the necessity the actors see in it. West et al. (2007) define cooperation as a social 
behaviour of actors and suppose that it provides actors applying this behaviour with a direct 
benefit. This benefit is high enough to outweigh the costs of performing cooperation (West, Griffin, 
and Gardner 2007, 416). Cooperation defined as a specific type of interaction, namely intended and 
well-directed interaction, can be understood as a network because as Jakobi (2009) and Scharpf 
(1993) argue: “established pattern of interaction between different actors that are interested in a 
common subject matter” (cf. Jakobi 2009, 4) can be defined as networks (Jakobi 2009; Scharpf, 
1993, 72). We conceptualize cooperation thus as a specific type of actor network: the network of 
cooperation existent in trans-boundary water quality management. A network of cooperation is a 
network of actors interacting with each other intentionally having a common goal in their eyes. 
The network is conceptualized as graphs where the nodes represent actors (i.e. organizations) 
and the edges are cooperation ties between these actors. 
The concept of borders in CPR theory and theories of cooperation 
Common-pool resource (CPR) theory has identified a range of conditions on the resource’s as well 
as at the actors’ side “that are supportive of the emergence of cooperation” (Schlager 2004, 151). 
But none of these conditions considers the effect of territorial borders. On the side of the resource 
conditions we find “the spatial extent of a resource system” that implies the dimension of space, 
but which does not relate to the concept of border. Neither is the aspect of borders represented 
among the actors’ conditions that are in favour of cooperation.2 Other studies focusing on triggers 
for cooperation came to the conclusion that a sound knowledge of the resource’s problem 
(Heikkila and Gerlak 2005, 605), similar beliefs among actors, and state actors with formal 
decision-making power who tend to be more active in cooperative settings enhance cooperation 
(Ingold and Fischer 2014, 95) – factors that do not consider border effects. A leadership position 
of one or several actors was also identified as a key mechanism of cooperation in a study on trans-
boundary water governance in the USA and Canada (Norman and Bakker 2005, 16). In their 
research Norman and Bakker (2005) conducted interviews with persons “active in water 
governance” in two cross-border regions at the US-Canadian border. They observed that many of 
their interviewees pointed out that different governance structures in the two countries were a 
barrier to cooperation (Norman and Bakker 2005, 16). Despite this study, administrative and 
political borders remain for the most part a neglected issue in CPR theory and studies on 
cooperation. CPR theory has not yet scrutinized the significance of borders for cooperation in 
resource use settings. Whenever the term boundary is used in socio-ecological system analyses, it 
refers to ecological borders (e.g. resources’ boundaries or the crossing of one ecological system 
into another), the social distinction between actors or the division between the social and the 
ecological spheres (Bodin et al. 2016; Bodin, Sandström, and Crona 2016). 
                                                          
2 These are, inter alia, trust and reciprocity among the actors; a certain autonomy towards higher level authorities; and 
a common understanding of the functioning of the resource’s system (Schlager 2004, 152). 
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The ambivalent effects of borders on social interactions 
Theories that explain border effects are not specific to inter-organizational network relations, but 
common to all sorts of social phenomena. The presence of territorial borders which delineate, 
separate and differentiate space into distinct territorial units and which determine the 
territoriality of social actors influence the way in which interactions occur. Defined as territorial 
dividing lines borders frame social action and interaction (Newman 2006). There is a greater ease 
of operating within known structures and networks and nation-states are the principal providers 
of such a familiarity (Helliwell 1998). Conversely, unfamiliarity hinders the creation of community 
(Spierings and van der Velde 2013) and, by implication, the development of common policy 
objectives. The existence of institutional, cultural or mental barriers also leads to increasing 
uncertainty and transactions costs and explains in parts why borders still matter (Houtum 1998). 
As van Houtum (1999, 330) explains: 
« Several authors have argued that social interaction and socialization processes, despite or 
maybe because of the globalization, are still most dominant in the home region and nation 
(Porter 1990; Paasi 1996; Storper 1997). The social interaction with others in a bounded 
territory, provides individuals with feelings of familiarity, security and identity. Borders 
therefore not only separate different territories, but also different nations, systems of 
socialization, and identities. » 
For all these reasons borders are usually considered to have a negative impact on social 
interactions. They are considered as barriers that impede flows and exchanges. However, 
understood as social and political constructs borders are not fixed but rather subject to 
contestation and change. Due to de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation processes, borders 
can shift in time and space; their meaning and significance can alter as new practices develop. All 
this complicates the border effect puzzle. In some cases, national borders have been progressively 
opened to the flows of people, goods, finance and services. Intra-EU borders as one such example 
owe this to the European Union’s internal market and the Schengen Agreement. On the one hand, 
following van Houtum’s (1999) argument aforementioned, we may nevertheless hypothesize that 
the institutional, cultural and mental barriers that persist are negatively affecting cross-border 
policy interactions. In addition, the time-dependence of public policies often implies that the 
gradual opening of borders does not necessarily translate into immediate effects. In other words, 
national borders having become more porous does not imply that the above-mentioned negative 
effects have disappeared.  
On the other hand, opening borders may offer new opportunities for actors that are engaged in 
cross-border relations and cooperation and may therefore also be conceived of as having positive 
effects on social and political interactions. According to van Geenhuizen and Ratti (2001) the 
advantages that flow from a greater opening-up of borders are linked to three factors, namely the 
presence of opportunities for interaction, the limited impact of any residual barriers, and the 
capacity of actors to face new challenges. The main reason why the opening of borders may offer 
new opportunities has to do with the possibility of taking advantage of (a) the contact factor 
(borders as interface), (b) the differentiation factor (borders as locus of hybridization and 
innovation), and (c) the affirmation factor of borders (borders as symbols). First, the opening of 
borders may induce positive externalities due to cross-border spill-overs. In addition, the access 
to critical mass in terms of knowledge networks or other resources represent key elements for 
scale and agglomeration economies (Rietveld 2012). Second, as noted by Sohn (2014, 596) “the 
confrontation of different ideas, values and representations can lead to the overcoming of 
constraints through negotiation and innovation.” The border opportunity is therefore founded on 
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valorising mutual differences (i.e., complementarities) and processes of adaptation as well as 
mutual learning negotiated through daily contacts (i.e., hybridization and innovation). Third, the 
symbolic dimension of the border can also be mobilised by actors that engage in cross-border 
activities and who aim at reinforcing their political or institutional prestige and recognition. 
The research questions and hypotheses   
Border effects and even more so the effect of border perceptions on cooperation are under-
represented in theories on cooperation and social-ecological systems as well as in CPR theory. 
Theories explaining border effects do not consider the aspect of border perceptions and their 
influence on social interaction either. Given that there exist 276 trans-boundary river basins 
accounting for about 60% of the worldwide freshwater flow3 cross-border water use settings are 
rather the rule than the exception. If we further consider that more than half of these international 
river basins “lack any type of cooperative management framework” (De Stefano et al. 2010, 67; 
UN 2012, 32), it becomes even more evident that research on the impact of borders on inter-
organizational cooperation is noteworthy. We therefore state the following two research 
questions:  
RQ 1: How do actors engaged in trans-boundary water quality management perceive the 
impact of borders on cross-border cooperation?  
RQ 2: To what extent do border perceptions impact cooperation among actors engaged in 
trans-boundary water quality management? 
To answer our first research question we draw on theoretical insights presented earlier: we 
defined nine types of border effects on cross-border cooperation that we presented in our survey. 
The nine border effects are: a) diverging political-administrative systems; b) different idioms; c) 
diverging personal and financial resources; d) different salience of a topic; e) different priorities 
regarding the course of action; f) different norms (i.e. limiting values); g) joint learning; h) 
complementing expertise and capacities; and i) sharing of costs. In our survey, we asked the actors 
to evaluate their perception of these different border effects on cross-border cooperation. The 
analysis of their responses will provide answers to our first research question.   
To formulate a theoretical answer to our second research question we draw on thoughts from the 
aforementioned theories stressing the positive as well as the negative effect borders can have on 
social and political interactions.4 We want to make the general point of border effect perceptions 
playing a role for the emergence of cooperation: 
H 1: The more negative actors’ perceptions of border effects on cooperation are, the 
less likely it is that these actors engage in cooperation. 
H 2: The more positive actors’ perceptions of border effects on cooperation are, the 
more likely it is that these actors engage in cooperation.  
Research Design 
The case of the tri-national region of Basel 
To answer our research questions we analyse cooperation patterns and border perceptions 
among actors engaged in water quality management within a trans-boundary region. Our case 
study is the cross-border region of Basel in the international catchment area of the river Rhine. It 
                                                          
3 UN Water. Topic: transboundary waters. http://www.unwater.org/topics/transboundary-waters/en/  
4 Our first research question being a descriptive and explorative one does not ask for a hypothesis. 
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is a single case study, whose object of study – the cooperation within water quality management 
in a trans-boundary region – “is a specific, unique, bounded system” (Stake 2008, 445). Basel is 
located at the international tri-point where Switzerland, Germany and France meet. Thus, actors 
involved in water quality management of surface water of the river Rhine come from different 
countries, different sectors and act at different levels. The territorial setting that prevails in the 
tri-national catchment area of the river Rhine in Basel makes this case particularly relevant for 
our empirical investigations given the unavoidable nature of national borders in water quality 
management. Our method is that of inferential network analysis, which implies that we do a 
quantitative analysis within our single case study. Besides the statistical analysis, we also apply 
an explorative and descriptive approach when answering our first research question. The case 
study which is “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and 
within its real-life context” (Yin 2009, 14) is thus suitable for the purpose of our study.    
The water quality issue at stake is that of micro-pollutants in surface water in the river Rhine. 
Micro-pollutants are chemical substances appearing in very low concentration in surface water. 
They are released to the environment through human activities like production processes in 
industry, through settlements and agriculture. They are a rather new issue in environmental 
politics, as they were not detectable in water resources until recently. Studies show that micro-
pollutants have negative impacts on ecosystems and scientists concern that they are carcinogenic 
and may increase physiological changes in animals (Touraud et al. 2011). Micro-pollutants in 
surface water are a common-pool resource (CPR) problem: by diminishing water quality they 
constitute a water quality issue. In CPR theory this phenomenon is framed as a problem of over-
appropriation: the over-exploitation of the CPR water through its infiltration with micro-
pollutants creates negative externalities (Villamayor-Tomas et al. 2014, 364). Micro-pollutants 
can also be interpreted as a supply-side provision problem that refers to the appropriators’ 
motivations to contribute to the maintenance or provision of a CPR (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 
1994, 9ff). Micro-pollutants are thus a typical and topical example of a common-pool resource and 
a water quality problem. 
The data 
We derive our data from a survey carried out in spring 2016. A total of 49 collective actors was 
identified as being actively involved in the management of micro-pollutants in the surface water 
of the river Rhine in the Basel region. The actors were identified through expert interviews which 
were led in March and April 2016 and through an actors’ analysis based on the socio-economic 
system (SES) framework.  
In order to gather information on the level of organizations we interviewed managers, CEOs and 
heads of office who we can safely assume to possess a fair understanding of the actions of their 
respective organization as well as of the regional water quality policy regarding micro-pollutants 
and the actors involved in it.  
Additionally to the interviews, we identified the actors using the SES framework. The SES 
framework is an analytical tool to study the influence social and ecological factors have on actors’ 
interactions (Sadoff and Grey 2005, 424). The framework helps reflecting dynamics between the 
ecological and the social sphere when analysing a certain environmental issue and the 
interactions of actors involved in this environmental issue. It consists of a so-called “action 
situation” within which these interactions take place and four components representing the social 
and the ecological system respectively. These components describe the external factors that 
influence the action situation. The resource system (RS) and the resource unit (RU) represent the 
ecological system and are connected as the RU is always a part of the respective RS under scrutiny. 
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The governance system (GS) and the actors (A) stand for the social system. They are linked with 
each other as the governance system, understood as the rules-in-use5, rule-making organizations 
and the respective policy area (McGinnis and Ostrom 2014), is defining and setting the rules actors 
behave upon (Basurto et al. 2013, 1367; Ostrom 2009). The SES framework offers a way to identify 
those actors involved in the environmental issue of micro-pollutants: we checked for all those 
actors in the region of Basel that are users of the resource unit surface water (belonging to the 
resource system river Rhine) and its pollutant micro-pollutants. We distinguished between direct 
and indirect users and evaluated the intensity of the surface water use, the actor’s dependence on 
the resource unit and whether the resource unit’s quality was essential for the use. Through this 
approach we identified a range of environmental NGOs and scientific actors (indirect users), 
service provider like water works (direct users), and industrial actors like waste water treatment 
plants and pharmaceutical firms (direct users)6. Furthermore, we identified the actors through 
their relation to the governance system. We searched for rule-making organizations in the policy 
area “water policy” in the Basel region that are in charge of the regulation of micro-pollutants. 
Also, we scrutinized which actors had commented on the laws and regulations concerning micro-
pollutants. This left us with 49 corporate actors comprising public and private entities embedded 
in the trans-boundary water quality management of the Basel region, coming from different 
sectors like industry, the civil society, water associations, science and the state. 
The data was collected through a structured questionnaire that was sent to all 49 actors via post 
and E-mail. The questionnaire comprised questions about the actors’ interaction pattern with 
each other, their exchange of information and their perception of border effects.7 Out of the 49 
actors targeted 13 actors did not respond, which results in a network comprising 36 
organizations. The response rate amounts to 73.5%. 
The operationalization of the dependent, the independent and the control variables 
The actors were asked about their cooperation activities and their information exchange pattern. 
Their answers were then transformed into numerical data as required for Social Network 
Analysis. That is, through a questionnaire we were asking the actors to indicate in a list comprising 
all actors of the survey those ones the actors’ had been and still are cooperating with. We defined 
cooperation as the discussion of insights; the joint working out of options; the exchange of each 
other’s attitudes towards the issue at stake; and the evaluation of alternatives. We transformed 
the actors’ answers into a network matrix indicating which actors had been cooperating with each 
other. This conceptualization of a network of cooperation provides the dependent variable: 
cooperation ties between actors in a trans-boundary water quality mangement network. 
The survey’s question about actors’ perceptions of border effects on cooperation was subdivided 
in nine questions. Each one concerned one type of border effect and its possible impact on cross-
border cooperation as perceived by the actors. The actors’ answers to these nine sub-questions 
were then converted into an index of the actors’ perception of border effects on cooperation. Six of 
the single border effects were associated as having a negative impact on cooperation while the 
other three border effects were given a positive connotation regarding their impact on 
cooperation.8 Whenever the actors agreed on a border’s effect on cooperation, be it positive or 
                                                          
5 That is, legal regulations and instruments regarding the environmental issue under investigation.  
6 In the case of industrial actors, use is understood as the use of surface water to dispose of chemical sewage, thereby 
creating the environmental problem of micro-pollutants. 
7 All these questions were asked to be answered from the organization’s point of view (and not from the individual’s 
point of view). 
8 The border effects associated with a negative impact on cooperation are: a) diverging political-administrative systems; 
b) different idioms; c) diverging personal and financial resources; d) different salience of a topic; e) different priorities 
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negative, this answer was valued with a 1. To build the index, we first calculated each actor’s 
average value of his perception of the negative and positive border effects respectively, to then 
subtract each actor’s average negative border effect perception from his average positive border 
effect perception. This left us with an index ranging from -1, meaning an actor perceives borders 
as having a very negative effect on cooperation, up to +1, indicating an actor that perceives 
borders as having a very positive effect on cooperation, with 0 indicating a balanced perception 
(i.e. the border is perceived as having as much negative effects as positive effects). This index of 
actors’ border perception regarding its effects on cooperation serves as independent variable. 
As there might be much more factors accounting for the creation of a cooperation tie between two 
actors in our study’s network of cooperation, we want to control for certain variables. To check 
for the influence similarity effects among actors could have on tie creation, we control for the 
following homophily covariates: an actor’s competence area, i.e. the level the actor is working at; 
the actor’s type; the actor’s nationality (being Swiss or not Swiss) and the actor’s beliefs9.  
As we had asked the actors in our survey to indicate those actors they deem important in the 
management process of micro-pollutants, we control for the impact an actor’s importance may 
have on tie creation.10 Furthermore, we control for two spatial variables that might account for 
the creation of a tie between actors: the distance between actors – following the argument that 
the closer two actors are the more likely is the chance that the two create a cooperation tie – and 
the actor’s distance to the border in the Basel region – arguing that being closer to a border may 
decrease the chance of engaging in tie creation with actors across the border as borders function 
as a barrier.  
Finally, we control for endogenous network effects, variables that are essential to the method we 
apply.   
The method 
To test whether the perception of border effects on cooperation has an influence on the creation 
of a tie between two actors in a network of cooperation, we apply a statistical model of the family 
of exponential random graph models (ERGM). ERGMs enable one to model the structure of ties of 
an entire network by depicting it with endogenous structural network properties and covariates. 
Endogenous network effects are inter alia triangles, cycles, density or clustering while exogenous 
network effects comprise edge covariates like different relations and node attributes (like actors’ 
age, sex or type) (Leifeld and Schneider 2012, 737; Hunter et al. 2008). The model not only 
estimates the covariates’ effects on network ties while simultaneously controlling for the 
influence of endogenous network effects on network ties; it also projects parameters which 
describe the forms of dependence existent in relational data (see Cranmer and Desmarais 2010, 
67). The ERGM thus takes network dependencies into consideration when estimating the causes 
for tie creation in a network. It is run via Markov Chain Monte Carlo Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation (MCMC MLE) and computed with the ergm package for R that comes with the 
statnet suite of packages (Handcock et al. 2003).  
                                                          
regarding the course of action; f) different norms (i.e. limiting values); the border effects with a positive connotation 
regarding their impact on cooperation are: g) joint learning; h) complementing expertise and capacities; and i) sharing 
of costs. 
9 Data on actors’ beliefs were also collected through the survey: in the questionnaire we asked actors about their deep 
core beliefs (cf. Sabatier and Weible 2007; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999). Based on the actors’ answers we grouped 
them into factions with same beliefs.   
10 Based on these data we coded all actors named important by 9 or more actors as important. 
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We included the following parameters into the model: The dependent variable, i.e. actors’ ties in 
the network of cooperation, processed into a directed network matrix; the independent variable, 
i.e. the index of border effect perception for each actor; and the control variables, comprising:  
a) exogenous factors, that is the following actor covariates: 
- spatial variables: actors’ competence area (regional; cantonal; national; Rhine basin 
wide) & actors’ proximity to a border (binary coding: being close to a border defined as 
being 30 km or less from the border) 
- actor attributes: actors’ importance, actor type (state actor; water association and 
environmental NGO; service provider; industry) & actors’ nationality (Swiss or Non-
Swiss) 
- edge-covariates: actors’ beliefs & distance between the actors 
 
b) the following endogenous network effects:  
- k-Outstars and In-stars 
- reciprocity  
- constant in-degree value throughout the randomly generated permutations of the 
original network (Gwidegree11)  
- triads (gwesp for closed triads and gwdsp12 for open triads) 
In addition to the ERGM that we calculated for our dependent variable tie creation in the network 
of cooperation, we ran ERGMs for two other network relations among the actors. Having also 
asked the actors about their technical and political information exchange among each other, we 
checked for the independent and control variables’ influence on these two other network relations 
in the same group of actors as well. We did so to check up on the data’s as well as the ERGM’s 
reliability (for results on these two ERGMs see Appendix I, models 2 and 3). Furthermore, we ran 
ERGMs estimating the single influence of each of the nine border effect perceptions on the creation 
of a cooperation tie. As these models didn’t give any sound results we focused on the border effect 
perception index as sole independent variable. 
Analysis & Assessment 
In the following, we are discussing the results of our analysis. Starting with the features of the 
network of cooperation and our dependent variable, the actors’ ties within this network, we then 
describe the variation of border effect perceptions among the actors. Finally, we outline the 
results of our inferential network analysis and infer the influence perceptions of borders might 
have on cooperation. 
Features of the network of cooperation 
The network of cooperation consists of 36 nodes – the actors engaged in water quality 
management of micro-pollutants in the Basel region – and has a density of 20.2 %, which reflects 
the fraction of all possible connections among nodes that is actually realized. The cooperation 
network is rather dense. Looking at the network as a graph (figure 1) we can see that actors that 
have been deemed important by the other actors – appearing in the graph as bigger circles and 
squares respectively – also have a central position within the network. The centrality measure we 
applied is degree centrality that is the in-coming and out-going ties an actor has. We can also see 
                                                          
11 Gwidegree being the abbreviation for “geometrically weighted in-degree distribution”. 
12 Gwesp standing for “geometrically weighted edgewise shared partner distribution“, gwdsp meaning “geometrically 
weighted dyad-wise shared partner distribution”. 
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that the German actors (GER 1, GER 2 and GER 3)13 are closely grouped together on one side of 
the network while French actors (FR 1 and FR 2)14 are linked to each other and to the international 
actors15. 
 
Figure 1: the network of cooperation, depicted with degree centrality. Circle nodes indicate Swiss actors, 
square nodes are Non-Swiss actors; the colours show the nodes’ actor type.  
If we further look at the actors’ types we observe that most actor types group together: industrial 
actors (red nodes) cluster together as well as water associations and environmental NGOs (blue 
nodes). Central actors from science (CH 5, CH 6, CH 8 and GER 3) and the state (CH 3, CH 10 and 
CH 14)16 seem to function as links between industrial actors, service provider and water 
associations and environmental NGOs.  
                                                          
13 The three German actors are two state actors at the regional level and one scientific actor located in Karlsruhe, 
Germany. For an entire list of the actors see Appendix II. 
14 The two French actors are two environmental NGOs active in water protection. 
15 The international actors in the network are: the Association of Waterworks Lake Constance-Rhine (AWBR), the 
International Association of Water Works in the Rhine Basin (IAWR), and the International Commission for the 
Protection of the Rhine (ICPR). 
16 Those scientific actors are the Cantonal Laboratory of the Canton of Basel City (CH 5), the Cantonal Laboratory of the 
Canton Basel Landschaft (CH 6), the Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic Science and Technology (Eawag) (CH 8) and the 
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Looking at the actors’ nationalities – circle nodes are Swiss actors, square nodes are not Swiss –, 
it becomes clear that the cooperation network of actors involved in water quality management in 
the region of Basel with the specific focus on micro-pollutants is limited to a wide range of Swiss 
actors and only a few international, German and French organizations. This fact, that first became 
apparent when identifying the relevant actors, is already a finding itself: it shows that cross-
border cooperation in water quality management in the region of Basel does not involve many 
actors across the Swiss-French and the Swiss-German border, but is mainly handled by Swiss 
actors. All the more is it interesting to understand how these actors perceive this border in regard 
to their work and whether this perception has an influence on the actors’ involvement in 
cooperation, that is, their creation of ties with other actors.  
Pattern of border effect perceptions 
When looking at the actors’ answering pattern concerning their perception of the nine individual 
border effects on cooperation (see figure 2), two aspects stand out: first, state actors and water 
associations together with environmental NGOs tend to perceive all nine border effects as 
influencing cooperation. Scientific actors, the industry and service provider perceive the different 
border effects as differently influential on cooperation. For instance, none of the industrial actors 
perceives different idioms as a hindrance to cooperation while 80 % of the industrial actors see a 
different salience of the issue (in our case micro-pollutants in surface water of the river Rhine) by 
actors coming from different sides of a border as a barrier to cooperation.  
 
Figure 2: border effect perception pattern among actors` groups.  
Second, three border effects have a strong variation on how they are perceived by the actor 
groups: different priorities regarding the course of action to be taken (in order to solve the issue at 
stake), the different political systems on each side of the border and, a little less so, the sharing of 
                                                          
Technologiezentrum Wasser, Karlsruhe (TZW) (GER 3); the central state actors are the Cantonal Office for 
Environmental Protection and Energy, Basel Landschaft (AUE BL) (CH 3), the Federal Office for the Environment, 
Switzerland (FOEN) (CH 10) and the organization of municipal infrastructure Switzerland (OKI) (CH 14). 
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costs across borders. Especially service provider and industrial actors do not perceive the 
different prioritization about the actions to be taken as a strong hindrance to cooperation; those 
two actor groups together with scientific actors also perceive different political-administrative 
systems less cumbersome than state actors and environmental NGOs together with water 
associations do. Sharing costs is also not such an important factor for scientific actors than it is for 
environmental NGOs and water associations when it comes to cooperation.   
The variation in the answering pattern among the actors’ groups can mainly be explained by the 
nature and stakes of each actor group. While service provider “simply” follow national guidelines 
and limiting values, state actors, NGOs with water associations and industrial actors bargain about 
exactly these guidelines and limiting values – which may lead to a different perception of these 
border effects on cooperation. Similarly do different resources and different political-
administrative systems play a bigger role for state actors and water associations and NGOs, who 
are dependent on public financing and the state system for their work, than they do for private or 
semi-private entities who have a fixed budget and act outside political systems. 
Looking at the aggregated perception of borders’ effects on cooperation, that is the index (figure 
3), we can see that most of the actors have an index value ranging between -0.25 and +0.24 (that 
is 17 actors or 47.2%). This indicates that these actors perceive borders as neither having a 
negative nor a positive influence on cooperation. Looking more closely at whom these actors are 
we find that the two German state actors, one French NGO and Swiss actors from all five actors’ 
groups17 are represented. Actors perceiving borders as having mainly a negative effect on 
cooperation are exclusively Swiss actors from the group of water associations and environmental 
NGOs (all three having an index of -0.67), the state (indices of -0.5 and -0.17) and science (indices 
of -0.33 and -0.17). Actors perceiving border effects on cooperation as mainly positive come from 
all five actors’ groups, with water associations and environmental NGOs and the industry being in 
the majority. 
 
Figure 3: distribution of the border effect perception index among actors. 
                                                          
17 The five actors’ groups are: service provider, state actors, industrial actors, science, and water associations with 
environmental NGOs. 
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Influence of border effect perception on cooperation 
In the following, we outline the results gained from testing the influence these border effect 
perceptions have on the creation of a tie between two actors in the network of cooperation. 
We did an inferential network analysis running an exponential random graph model (ERGM) to 
test the hypotheses. We checked for the independent and control variables’ influence on each of 
the actors’ incoming as well as outgoing ties in the network of cooperation.  
As mentioned in the section about the method, we also ran ERGMs for two further network 
relations among the actors: their political information exchange relations and their technical 
information exchange relations. There were no interesting findings on border effect perceptions’ 
influence on the tie creation in the former (see also Appendix I, model 2). The ERGM for the border 
effect perceptions’ impact on tie creation in the latter (see Appendix I, model 3) showed similar 
results as the model we estimated for the cooperation network (model 1). Overall, the values of 
the parameters showed a similar and coherent pattern across all three models, indicating that 
results are robust.   
The results of the ERGM for the cooperation network are displayed in table 1.18 The ERGM’s 
parameters (model 1) show a significant positive correlation between our independent variable 
“index of border effect perception” and the creation of in-coming cooperation ties of actors in the 
network. This indicates that a positive index, i.e. the fact that the border is perceived more as 
opportunity than as a constraint, increases the likelihood of an actor having in-coming ties. 
Concerning an actors’ out-going cooperation ties, the result does not show a significant correlation 
with the index of border effect perception. Nevertheless the results partially corroborate our 
second hypothesis which states that the higher the positive perception of border effects on 
cooperation, the likelier it is that actors engage in cooperation.  
In order to check whether negative values of the border perception index play a role in the 
creation of ties, in other words, to see whether a negative border perception impacts the creation 
of a tie between two actors, we adjusted our independent variable, i.e. the index. We split the index 
into two separate independent variables, one indicating the negative effects an actor is attributing 
to borders (IV B: an actor having a negative value of the border perception index), the other 
standing for an actor’s positive perception for borders’ effects on cooperation (IV C: an actor having 
a positive value of the border perception index).  
The variables were coded binary19 and an ERGM was estimated for each independent variable’s 
impact on the creation of a tie in the network of cooperation (model 1B for the IV B and model 1C 
for the IV C). The statistical estimations (model 1B) show a significant negative correlation 
between the independent variable B “negative index value” and an actor’s in-coming ties in the 
network of cooperation. An actor who perceives border effects as negative – independent of the 
perception’s intensity – is thus less likely to have in-coming ties. Or put differently, if an actor 
perceives border effects as a hindrance to cooperation, then he is likely to receive less in-coming 
ties. This finding supports our first hypothesis “the more negative actors’ perceptions of border 
effects on cooperation are, the less likely it is that these actors engage in cooperation” only 
partially: it tells us that the solely negative perception of border effects influences tie creation; it 
cannot give any information on the negative border perception’s intensity and its impact on the 
                                                          
18 We restricted the list to those factors that have a significant correlation with the creation of a tie between two actors. 
19 For the independent variable B – actor having a negative border perception index – actors with an index value of 0 or 
greater than 0 were encoded as a 0 while actors with an index value less than 0 were encoded as a 1. For the independent 
variable C – actor having a positive border perception index – it was the other way around: actors with an index value 
of 0 or less than 0 were encoded as a 0 while actors with an index value greater than 0 were encoded as a 1.  
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creation of a tie. The ERGM for our independent variable C “positive index value” (model 1C) 
indicates that whenever an actor has a positive perception of border effects on cooperation, s/he 
also has an increase in in-coming ties, as there is a strong positive correlation between IV C and 
an actor’s in-coming ties. This finding supports the results of model 1.  
=================================================================================== 
                                          Model 120         Model 1B     Model 1C 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
edges                                     -6.70 ***        -7.50 ***    -8.05 *** 
                                          (1.20)           (0.91)       (1.01)    
mutual                                     1.61 ***         1.60 ***     1.71 *** 
                                          (0.30)           (0.30)       (0.31)    
incoming ties: border perception index     0.94 **          
                                          (0.29)            
outgoing ties: border perception index    -0.42             
                                          (0.24)             
incoming ties: negative index value (IV B)                 -0.91 **               
                                                           (0.30)                   
outgoing ties: negative index value (IV B)                  0.37                  
                                                           (0.23)                 
incoming ties: positive index value (IV C)                               1.22 ***  
                                                                        (0.24)    
outgoing ties: positive index value (IV C)                              -0.51 ** 
                                                                        (0.20)    
node match: competence area (cantonal)     0.52 ***         0.62 ***     0.61 ***      
                                          (0.13)           (0.12)       (0.12)    
outgoing ties: competence area (national) -0.58 *          -0.55 *      -0.36     
                                          (0.27)           (0.27)       (0.29)    
outgoing ties: close to border            -0.44            -0.33        -0.25      
                                          (0.23)           (0.22)       (0.24)    
incoming ties: close to border            -0.34            -0.50        -0.83 *   
                                          (0.39)           (0.40)       (0.41) 
incoming ties: deemed important            2.45 ***         2.43 ***     2.67 *** 
                                          (0.66)           (0.62)       (0.72)    
node match: actor type (industry)          0.75 ***         0.79 ***     0.77 *** 
                                          (0.14)           (0.14)       (0.15)    
incoming ties: actor type science          0.89 *           1.19 **      0.82      
                                          (0.41)           (0.46)       (0.43)    
incoming ties: actor type service provider 0.86 *           0.87 *       0.71     
                                          (0.38)           (0.39)       (0.39)    
node match: being Swiss                    0.67 ***         0.71 ***     0.71 ***  
                                          (0.17)           (0.15)       (0.15)    
outgoing ties: being Swiss                -0.57 *          -0.54 *      -0.56 *    
                                          (0.25)           (0.25)       (0.25)    
incoming ties: being Swiss                 0.47             0.53         0.71     
                                          (0.41)           (0.39)       (0.40)    
edge-covariate: sharing same beliefs       0.13 **          0.13 **      0.15 ** 
                                          (0.05)           (0.05)       (0.05) 
edge-covariate: distance between actors   -0.09            -0.00         0.00      
                                          (0.05)            
gwidegree                                  5.56 ***         5.52 ***     6.38 ***  
                                          (1.60)           (1.50)       (1.71)    
gwesp.fixed.1                              0.84 ***         0.85 ***     0.85 ***  
                                          (0.10)           (0.10)       (0.10)    
gwdsp.fixed.1                             -0.02            -0.02        -0.03     
                                          (0.03)           (0.03)       (0.03) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
AIC                                       884.16          886.03       867.41     
BIC                                      1043.46         1045.33      1026.72     
Log Likelihood                           -411.08         -412.01      -402.71     
=================================================================================== 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05        
Table 1: results of the exponential random graph model estimations. 
                                                          
20 The model’s goodness of fit (GOF) proved to be satisfactory. 
 15 
 
At the same time we observe a significant negative correlation between IV C and an actor’s out-
going ties, meaning that an actor has less out-going ties when s/he perceives borders as an 
advantage to cooperation. 
For the control variables, the assumption of similarity effects between actors enhancing the chance 
for tie creation holds true (Berardo and Scholz 2010). So-called homophily between actors, that 
is similarities between ego and alter, leading actors to engage with their similar counterparts is 
evident in our data: actors with the same competence area – that is the same level they are 
operating at –, actors that have the same actor type, and those actors who are Swiss have the 
tendency to create ties with each other21. Actors sharing the same beliefs22 also tend to share a tie 
with each other. Actors that had been evaluated as important by the other actors are more likely 
to receive in-coming ties. A finding that sounds logical: the more important an actor is perceived 
as, the more in-coming cooperation ties he receives – because the other actors want to be in 
contact with actors important for the issue at stake. The spatial variables we were controlling for 
– an actors’ proximity to the border and the distances between the actors – did not prove to be 
significant in explaining the creation of cooperation ties in our network. A finding that is 
confirmed by the theoretical interpretation of borders acting as a barrier (van Houtum 1999).  
The endogenous network effects on the contrary – thus the factors immanent in the network – 
proved to be all significant except for the gwdsp term 23. The gwesp statistic is highly significant 
and positive, meaning that connected actors are “more likely than pure chance to have multiple 
transitive shared partners” (cf. Leifeld and Schneider 2012, 739). This refers to the argument that 
connected actors trust each other in their choice of partners, therefore creating ties with their 
partner’s partners. Furthermore, the gwidegree statistic and the reciprocity statistic (“mutual”) 
are positively correlated to tie creation, while the k-Outstars and In-stars term (“edges”) is 
significantly negative correlated to the creation of a tie between two actors.  
We effectively controlled for the common endogenous structural network properties and 
common similarity effects in the network while furthermore checking for the influence distances 
between actors and distance towards the common border have on tie creation. Despite the impact 
of homophily factors and endogenous network effects on tie creation, our results show that the 
perception actors have about the effect of borders on cooperation does have an influence on actors’ 
in-coming ties: the more positive an actor perceives the effect of borders on cooperation, the more 
in-coming ties s/he receives; and if an actor perceives borders as having a negative effect on 
cooperation, then s/he is likely to receive less in-coming ties. 
Conclusion 
Regarding our analysis of actors’ perception pattern of border effects we can state the following 
answer to our first research question “how do actors engaged in trans-boundary water quality 
management perceive the impact of borders on cross-border cooperation”: about 47% of the actors 
perceive borders as having positive as well as negative effects on cooperation (17 out of 36, see 
figure 3); about 39% of actors perceive borders as having a rather positive effect on cooperation 
(14 out of 36). This shows a tendency towards a positive perception of borders and their impact 
on cooperation among actors engaged in trans-boundary water quality management, focusing on 
                                                          
21 See “node match” parameters for the respective control variable in table 1. 
22 See “edge covariate: sharing same beliefs” in table 1. 
23 gwdsp “captures the propensity of any dyad (whether connected or unconnected) to have multiple transitive shared 
partners, which is a baseline effect of shared partners in the network” (Leifeld and Schneider 2012, 739). In other words, 
the term reflects the likelihood of any two actors, be they connected or not, to have several connections to the same 
actors, thus “sharing” these other actors; a pattern that is not observed in our network.  
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micro-pollutants in surface water of the river Rhine in the region of Basel. Looking at the single 
border effects out of which we built our index of border effect perception, we can see that most 
actors perceive the border effects “joint learning” and “complementing expertise and capacities” 
as positively and the border effect “different salience of a topic” as negatively influencing 
cooperation (cf. figure 2). A bigger variation in actors’ perceptions of border effects can be 
observed at the single effects “different priorities regarding the course of action”, “different 
norms” and “different idioms” as well as across the different groups of actors. Environmental 
NGOs, water associations and state actors all tend to perceive the single border effects as 
influential on cooperation. Service providers, scientific and industrial actors have a more 
differentiated perception about the different border effects and their impact on cooperation.  
Testing the influence actors’ perceptions of border effects on cooperation have on the creation of 
ties in a network of cooperation showed that actors who have a more positive perception of 
borders’ effects on cooperation have the tendency to have more in-coming ties while actors with 
a simple negative perception of borders’ effects have the tendency to have less in-coming ties. 
Looking at the distribution of the border effect perception index within our network of 
cooperation, we can observe that the three actors with the lowest index value of -0.67 (actors CH 
2, CH 19 and CH 24) have a rather low degree of in-coming ties sitting at the periphery of the 
network (cf. figure 1). The eight most central actors of the network with in-degrees of between 11 
and 22 (and a reputational in-degree of between 17 and 29)24 have a rather positive index value 
of between 0.0 and 0.525. The two observations are illustrating our statistical results. The 
following graph (graph 1) indicates a very weak relation of an increase of a positive border effect 
perception and an increase in in-coming ties in the network of cooperation: 
 
Graph 1: relation between actors’ border effect perception index and actors’ in-degree of cooperation ties. 
                                                          
24 These actors are CH 3, CH 4, CH 8, CH 10, CH 13, CH 21, CH 22 and GER 3. 
25 Two actors having an index of the value 0.0, one having an index of 0.167, three actors having an index of 0.33 and 
one having an index of 0.5. Only one actor of this group of central actors (CH 3) has a negative index value (-0.5). 
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Two outliers with a very high in-degree centrality are conspicuous. They are the Swiss Federal 
Institute of Aquatic Science and Technology (Eawag) with a tie in-degree of 20 and the Water 
Division of the Swiss Federal Office for the Environment (FOEN) with an in-degree of 22.   
Our second research question ”to what extent do border perceptions impact cooperation among 
actors engaged in trans-boundary water quality management?” can be answered as follows: first, 
border perceptions have an impact on cooperation ties of actors engaged in trans-boundary water 
quality management; and second, they do so in two complementary ways: If an actor perceives a 
border as having negative effects on cooperation, then s/he is likely to have less in-coming 
cooperation ties – confirming our first hypothesis only partially. And, the more positive actors’ 
perceptions of border effects are, the more likely is an increase in actors’ in-coming cooperation 
ties – confirming our second hypothesis. 
In conclusion, one can claim that the positive as well as the negative perception of borders’ effects 
on cooperation have an influence on the creation of cooperation ties between actors in a trans-
boundary water quality management setting. We cannot deduce from our study whether positive 
perceptions are due to already existing cooperation structures, thus whether the positive 
perception of borders’ effects on cooperation is enforced through positive experience of 
cooperation, suggesting a reinforcing mechanism of cooperation and the perception of borders’ 
effects on cooperation. Also, in a next step our analysis should be widened and applied to other 
trans-boundary water management settings to check whether results are reliable across cases. 
Nevertheless, we can state that border perceptions do influence the creation of cooperation ties 
in water policy management to a certain extent, thereby enriching theories of cooperation.  
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Appendix 
Appendix I: results of the three ERGMs  
=================================================================================== 
                                          Model 1          Model 2        Model 3 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
edges                                     -6.70 ***        -7.72 ***      -6.44 *** 
                                          (1.20)           (1.26)         (1.09) 
mutual                                     1.61 ***         1.75 ***       1.74 *** 
                                          (0.30)           (0.38)         (0.29) 
incoming ties: border perception index     0.94 **         -0.02           0.86 **  
                                          (0.29)           (0.36)         (0.28) 
outgoing ties: border perception index    -0.42            -0.00          -0.03  
                                          (0.24)           (0.29)         (0.24)  
node match: competence area (cantonal)     0.52 ***         0.79 ***       0.40 ** 
                                          (0.13)           (0.19)         (0.15)  
outgoing ties: competence area (national) -0.58 *          -0.72          -0.78 ** 
                                          (0.27)           (0.47)         (0.28) 
outgoing ties: close to border            -0.44            -0.52          -0.07 
                                          (0.23)           (0.41)         (0.25) 
incoming ties: close to border            -0.34            -0.36          -0.35 
                                          (0.39)           (0.49)         (0.35) 
incoming ties: deemed important            2.45 ***         1.76 ***       1.46 *** 
                                          (0.66)           (0.44)         (0.36) 
node match: actor type (industry)          0.75 ***         0.83 ***       0.61 *** 
                                          (0.14)           (0.18)         (0.16)  
incoming ties: actor type science          0.89 *           0.18           0.91 * 
                                          (0.41)           (0.66)         (0.38) 
incoming ties: actor type service provider 0.86 *           0.86           0.70 * 
                                          (0.38)           (0.54)         (0.34)    
node match: being Swiss                    0.67 ***         0.89 ***       0.80 *** 
                                          (0.17)           (0.23)         (0.17) 
outgoing ties: being Swiss                -0.57 *          -0.08          -0.41 
                                          (0.25)           (0.44)         (0.29) 
incoming ties: being Swiss                 0.47            -0.03           0.57 
                                          (0.41)           (0.58)         (0.39) 
edge-covariate: sharing same beliefs       0.13 **          0.11           0.15 ** 
                                          (0.05)           (0.06)         (0.05) 
edge-covariate: distance between actors   -0.09             0.01           0.00 
                                          (0.05)           (0.07)         (0.06) 
gwidegree                                  5.56 ***         3.37 ***       2.67 ** 
                                          (1.60)           (0.95)         (0.95) 
gwesp.fixed.1                              0.84 ***         0.81 ***       0.66 *** 
                                          (0.10)           (0.10)         (0.10)  
gwdsp.fixed.1                             -0.02             0.03          -0.07 * 
                                          (0.03)           (0.03)         (0.03) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
AIC                                       884.16           633.90         927.18 
BIC                                      1043.46           793.20        1086.48  
Log Likelihood                           -411.08          -285.95        -432.59 
=================================================================================== 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Table I: results of the exponential random graph model estimations for three different network relations: 
cooperation ties (model 1); political information exchange ties (model 2); and technical information 
exchange ties (model 3). 
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Appendix II: List of actors 
N° Actor ID Original Name English Name Index 
Incoming 
ties 
1 GER1 Landratsamt Lörrach, Deutschland 
District administration of the city of 
Lörrach, Germany 
0,167 2 
2 CH1 
Amt für Industrielle Betriebe, Basel 
Landschaft 
Department for industrial business, 
canton of Basel Landschaft 
0,67 7 
3 FR1 Alsace Nature, France  Alsace Nature, France  0 2 
4 FR2 
Association pour la Protection de la 
Nappe Phréatique de la Plaine d'Alsace, 
France 
Association for the protection of the 
groundwater of the plain of Alsace, 
France 
0,67 2 
5 CH2 Gewässerschutz Nordwestschweiz 
Prevention of Water Pollution 
Northwest Switzerland 
-0,67 2 
6 CH3 
Amt für Umweltschutz und Energie, 
Basel Landschaft  
Cantonal Office for Environmental 
Protection and Energy, Basel 
Landschaft 
-0,5 12 
7 CH4 
Amt für Umwelt und Energie, Basel 
Stadt 
Cantonal Office for the Environment 
and Energy, Basel City 
0 13 
8 INT1 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Wasserwerke 
Bodensee-Rhein (AWBR) 
Association of Waterworks Lake 
Constance-Rhine 
1 7 
9 CH5 Kantonales Labor Basel-Landschaft  
Cantonal Laboratory Basel 
Landschaft 
-0,167 8 
10 CH6 Kantonales Labor Basel Stadt Cantonal Laboratory Basel City -0,167 8 
11 CH7 
Vereinigung der kantonalen Fachleute 
für Gewässerbiologie und –chemie 
(Cercl`Eau) 
Association of the cantonal experts 
of water biology and chemistry 
-0,33 3 
12 GER2 Stadt Weil am Rhein, Deutschland City of Weil am Rhein, Germany 0 0 
13 CH8 
Eidgenössische Anstalt für Wasserver-
sorgung, Abwasserreinigung und 
Gewässerschutz (Eawag) 
Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic 
Science and Technology 
0,33 20 
14 CH9 
Kommissionen für Umwelt, Raum-
planung und Energie des Ständerates 
Council of State's Committee on the 
Environment, Spatial Planning and 
Energy 
0 3 
15 CH10 
Bundesamt für Umwelt (BAFU),  
Abteilung Wasser 
Federal Office for the Environment 
(FOEN), Water Division 
0,167 22 
16 CH11 
Bundesamt für Lebensmittelsicherheit 
und Veterinärwesen (BLV) 
Federal Food Safety and Veterinary 
Office (FSVO) 
0,5 3 
17 CH12 Handelskammer beider Basel (HKBB) Basel Chamber of Commerce  0,33 4 
18 INT2 
Internationale Arbeitsgemeinschaft der 
Wasserwerke im Rheineinzugsgebiet 
(IAWR) 
International Association of Water 
Works in the Rhine Basin (IAWR) 
1 5 
19 INT3 
Internationale Kommission zum Schutz 
des Rheins (IKSR) 
International Commission for the 
Protection of the Rhine (ICPR) 
0,33 9 
20 CH13 Industrielle Werke Basel 
Industrial Works Basel, drinking 
water provider 
0,5 15 
21 CH14 Organisation Kommunale Infrastruktur  
Organization of municipal 
infrastructure 
0 2 
22 CH15 Novartis International  Novartis International 0,5 5 
23 CH16 Pro Natura, Schweiz 
Pronatura: Environmental 
Protection Organization of 
Switzerland 
0,167 6 
24 CH17 F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG La Roche plc 0 5 
25 CH18 
Schweizerischer Brunnenmeister-
verband 
Swiss Association of well gaffers 0 3 
26 CH19 Schweizerischer Fischereiverband  Swiss Fishery Association -0,67 6 
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27 CH20 Schweizerischer Gemeindeverband 
Swiss Association of the 
Municipalities 
-0,167 1 
28 CH21 
Schweizerischer Verein des Gas- und 
Wasserfaches  
Swiss Gas and Water Industry 
Association  
0 11 
29 GER3 
Technologiezentrum Wasser, Karlsruhe, 
Deutschland 
German Water Centre, Karlsruhe, 
Germany 
0,33 13 
30 CH22 
Verband Schweizer Abwasser- und 
Gewässerschutzfachleute  
Swiss Water Association 0,33 13 
31 CH23 Hardwasser AG, Basel 
Hardwasser plc, 
drinking water provider in Basel 
0,167 10 
32 CH24 WWF, Schweiz 
World Wide Fund for Nature, 
Switzerland 
-0,67 7 
33 CH25 Wasserwerk Reinach und Umgebung Drinking water provider in Reinach 0,5 3 
34 CH26 
Abwasserreinigungsanlage Basel, 
ProRheno AG 
waste water treatment plant 
(WWTP) Basel, ProRheno plc 
0 7 
35 CH27 Industriekläranlage ProRheno AG WWTP Chemistry ProRheno plc 0 7 
36 CH28 
Abwasserreinigungsanlage Rhein, 
Schweizerhalle 
WWTP Rhein, Schweizerhalle 0,83 8 
